Explosions are again rocking central Iraq, killing more United States soldiers. The recent violence focuses the world’s attention on the impending U.S. exit from Iraq and highlights the disconnect between political rhetoric and political reality.
These spates of violence sent messages that can be construed as an Iraqi demand for US withdrawal and a return to a pre-invasion sense of national identity and sovereignty. Indeed, this is the message that most of the Iraqis carrying out the attacks feel they are delivering. Likewise, Iraqi leaders, of both formal and informal groups, deliver ringing nationalistic speeches about occupation and American injustice.
Unbeknownst to the people in the street, however, the same Iraqi leaders who are extorting the ills of the American occupation are entreating the Americans to stay longer. In a famous line from the Godfather, Don Corleone remarked that a man with a briefcase can steal more money than 99 men with guns. In Iraq, the question is how much money a man with a briefcase can steal, if he also manipulates the gunmen. Is it possible for men with the briefcases to both encourage, and bargain against, the gunmen? In Iraq, it is not only possible, it is expected for the following reasons.
First, most, if not each, Iraqi politician aspires to the same epic reputation as Saddam Hussein. Most of the more successful politicians have successfully cultivated a cult of personality built on contrived resistance to foreign occupation and presence. Ironically, this position of strength forces the political leadership to remain dependent on American-provided security and social services. Doing so, allows the Iraqi leadership to complete their image of power and competence by delivering services to their constituents. Secretary Gates alluded to the tension between image and dependence in a recent Senate hearing, when he remarked that " the [Iraqi] politicians… understand the need for this kind of [American] help, but no one wants to be the first one there supporting it." Publicly acknowledging the desire for an extension of American troops in Iraq would expose the men with briefcases as weak and duplicitous. Worse, they may become them exposed to the very gunmen that they now purport to support.
Second, the political power vacuum still exists in Iraq. Dozens of parliamentary proceedings, compromises and constitutional conventions later, Iraq still lacks an institutional structure that can modulate and distribute essential services, security, and political power. Instead a corrupt system is balanced precariously on American aid spending at certain flashpoints. This spending is most assured while Americans are in-country. If American support falls away too early, the leaders, secular, political and religious, will be sent scrambling in a power grab that will be costly. Avoiding this overt crisis, even by secretly encouraging U.S. troops to stay on longer, is the least costly option.
Third, American troops mean American dollars. American dollars mean big projects. So long as Americans are at the table, the failure of Iraqi political initiatives will be relatively without consequence. For example, the Iraqi parliament can spend time debating the merits of a smoking ban in public places. (June 2011) This latest display of parliamentary priorities demonstrates that Iraqi politicians will neither consider nor accept responsibility for sourcing and executing the implementation of essential service infrastructure. With the Americans in country as experts, a role recently suggested by Iraqi President Nuri al-Maliki, Iraqi politicians can continue to selectively insert themselves into the contracting process. This means more opportunity for graft. This approach of avoidance and corruption has become so common, that most Iraqis remain frustrated. "The [political] debate is good but the problem is putting things into action. Corruption will stop these projects from becoming reality," said Lamya Salim, 37, a housewife in Baghdad.
There is little objective doubt that Iraq continues to be plagued by large structural gaps that imperil its ability to survive a complete American pull-out. The most pressing challenges remain the same as they were in 2004. Effectively managing the expectations of the Iraqi populace, such that opportunistic calls-to-arms fall on deaf ears, should be a priority. Further the dialogue on to what extent the United States extends its presence in Iraq should be predicated on honesty from Iraqi leadership. For eight years, American policy has been attacked by gunmen and extorted by men with briefcases. Before the United States commits to extending in Iraq, the need to make an offer that cannot be refused.
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